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Abstract 
This study examined faculty awareness of computer usage regulations in the following areas:  awareness, 
diffusion, effectiveness, and perception of the security environment.  In addition, the concept of social trust 
as it relates to computer security was explored.  In general, the survey found respondents to be rather 
neutral in regards to their knowledge of computer security regulations.  They also tended to have less 
confidence in their peers’ or students’ knowledge of these regulations.  Not surprisingly, those who 
perceived the risk of computer misuse to be high were more likely to discuss it with their students.  The 
most interesting part of this study lies in the concept of social trust as it relates to computer security.  Our 
results provide some support for the notion that many faculty members may simply fail to read the policies 
since other, potentially more knowledgeable, individuals are in charge of preventing computer misuse 
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Introduction  
While computers have increasingly become indispensable in both business and education, incidences of both computer 
security violations and misuse are occurring at an alarming rate.  Security violations run the gamut from denial of service and 
viral attacks to information theft.  In fact, the security incident rate now doubles every year (Piscitello and Kent, 2003).  The 
2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey recently found that over 90% of respondents had detected security 
breaches, up from 85% the prior year (Power, 2002).  Power (2002) also notes that the cost of these incidents has increased 
dramatically.  Although only 44% of respondents quantified financial losses due to these incidents, the total losses reported 
totaled $455.8 million, up from $377.8 million in the 2001 survey. 
Universities may be even more susceptible to security violations.  The unique nature of the teaching/learning/research 
environment requires a large number and variety of computing platforms, networks, and software packages.  Many times, 
faculty, staff, or students may not be aware of the nature of the networks on which they install software.  This can lead to 
inadequate security procedures that can leave the system open to security breaches (Rezmierski et al., 2002).   
In addition, universities are also besieged by incidents of misuse including peer to peer file sharing, accessing inappropriate 
websites, and copyright infringement..  At the University of Florida, for example, 3,500 simultaneous connections to Kazaa 
were recorded last year (King, 2003).  Obviously this is both a legal and bandwidth problem. 
In an attempt to limit these problems, many universities have instituted written computer usage policies for faculty, staff, and 
students.  Gaining awareness of these policies has sometimes proved difficult.  Students, in particular, often obtain 
information about computer security regulations from student handbooks, campus newspaper articles, and word of mouth.  
More importantly, students often look to faculty for information regarding proper computer use.  It is important, therefore, 
that faculty be aware of and understand computer usage policies.  For that reason, this research investigates faculty awareness 
of those policies. 
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Computer Usage Policies 
Computer usage policies are considered the cornerstone of computer security (Backhouse and Dhillon, 1995).  These written 
policy statements detail acceptable and unacceptable uses of an organizational information system, and often contain 
information regarding sanctions for unacceptable use as well.  Such statements are thought to reduce the performance of 
misuse within organizations (Straub, 1987). 
Computer usage policies are based on the Theory of General Deterrence (Harrington, 1996).  The Theory of General 
Deterrence (TGD) suggests that punishing an offender will prevent others from committing the same action.  In short, “the 
imposition of sanctions on one person may demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and 
thereby discourage criminal behavior in the general population” (Nagin, 1978, p. 96). 
However, most computer usage policies share one critical assumption with the TGD.  These policies, like the TGD, assume 
that individuals are familiar with the policies and sanctions in question.  Unfortunately, existing research suggests that most 
individuals are not aware of actual sanctions (Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure (State of California), 1975).  As a 
result, many TGD researchers have recommended focusing on perceived rather than actual sanctions (Andenaes, 1975; 
Anderson, 1979; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Gibbs, 1975; Henshel and Carey, 1975; Williams and Hawkins, 1986).   
In short, the existence of computer usage policies within an organization or university may have little effect on the 
performance of computer misuse if the users are unfamiliar with such policies.  Rather, research examining computer misuse 
should focus on user perceptions of policies, rather than upon the actual policies themselves. 
Student Awareness of University Computer Usage Policies 
Within the university setting, computer usage policies are used to inform students and employees of acceptable and 
unacceptable uses (and sanctions) of the academic computing resource.  Unfortunately, few universities actually insist that 
users review the university computer usage policies.  Some universities do mention the policies during new student 
orientation; while others simply insist that all users sign a form agreeing to abide by the policies.  Of course, most users sign 
these forms without actually reading the policies (just as most users install software without actually reading the software 
license agreement).  Thus, many university users are unfamiliar with the university computer usage policies governing their 
use of the systems. 
A recent study evaluated student awareness of university computer usage policies at three midwestern universities (Foltz, 
Cronan, and Jones, 2004).  Less than one fourth of the 416 respondents had read the computer usage policies at their 
respective universities.  In addition, most students were unable to identify methods used by their universities to distribute 
such policies.  Although over half (59%) realized that computer support departments distributed usage policies, only 22% 
reported classroom distribution of such policies.  Further, only 23% reported informal class discussions regarding correct and 
incorrect usage, while 17% reported informal computer lab discussions about the university computer usage policies.  Fewer 
than 7% reported receiving information about university computer usage policies at organizational (club) meetings.  
Obviously, most students surveyed were not fully aware of the university computer usage policies.   
Prior studies suggest that university students conduct a surprising amount of misuse.  For example, Skinner and Fream (1997) 
found that about half of the respondents to a survey conducted at a southern university acknowledged committing some form 
of misuse during their lifetimes.  In addition, Hollinger (1988) conducted focused interviews with eleven college students, 
including eight randomly selected from an upper-level computer science course and three known offenders.  Of the eight, 
only four reported “no significant deviant activity” (p. 200) although these four did report occasional trading of stolen 
(pirated) software.  Five of the eight randomly selected students reported many instances of gaining unauthorized access to 
other student accounts to browse or change data files. 
Faculty Awareness of University Computer Usage Policies 
While a number of recent studies have focused upon student computer misuse and student awareness of university computer 
usage policies, no research evaluating faculty awareness of usage policies has been performed.  This lack of research is 
concerning for two reasons.  First, faculty members are valid users of university computer systems and thus are also potential 
misusers.  This problem is exaggerated by the greater access often enjoyed by faculty members.  For example, faculty 
members with computers in their offices are able to work without observation at their own convenience - a luxury often 
denied students working in traditional computer labs.  Further, faculty members often have access to sensitive information 
such as personal records about students and administrative information about other university employees.  These factors 
alone suggest that faculty should be aware of university computer usage policies. 
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Second, and more importantly, faculty members are both an information source and role model for students.  Faculty 
members often answer student questions regarding university policies.  While they are typically not responsible for educating 
students regarding such policies, an inability to answer such questions may result in improper understanding on the part of 
students.  In addition, faculty should be aware of their leadership role.  Their behavior should serve as a guide for students.  
Thus, faculty members, like all valid users, should be aware of university computer policies. 
The importance of faculty members in shaping student behavior is highlighted by the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 
1988). The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) suggests that behavior is best predicted by individual intention to perform that 
behavior (Ajzen, 1988; 1991; Doll and Ajzen, 1992).  Intentions capture motivating factors that influence a behavior (Beck 
and Ajzen, 1991) and are formed as a result of individual attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control (Ajzen, 1988).  Attitudes are individual positive or negative evaluations of a behavior (Ajzen, 1988; Doll 
and Ajzen, 1992), while perceived behavioral control reflects the individuals’ perception of their ability to perform the 
behavior in question (Ajzen, 1988).  Subjective norms reflect perceived social pressure to perform or not perform a behavior 
based on referent others (people important to the individual) (Ajzen, 1988).  Thus, the leadership role of faculty members 
may influence student performance of misuse, assuming that students perceive faculty members as important.  Also, the TPB 
has been tested and supported in the study of misuse (Foltz, Cronan, and Jones, 2002). 
Social Trust 
One factor that could potentially affect faculty members’ awareness of usage policies could be their degree of social trust.  
Social trust refers to the tendency of laypeople to trust experts to make correct decisions regarding technology.  Existing 
research in the area suggests that experts and laypeople often differ in opinions regarding the benefits and risks of technology 
hazards, partially because laypeople lack the expertise to correctly understand or evaluate these benefits and risks (Siegrist 
and Cvetkovich, 2000; Cvetkovich, Siegrist, Murray, and Tragessor, 2002; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, and Roth, 2000).  Since 
most universities provide highly-trained technical support personnel, many faculty members may simply fail to read the 
policies since other, potentially more knowledgeable, individuals are in charge of preventing computer misuse.  Although this 
seems like a logical decision, the consequences may be a lower level of faculty knowledge regarding university regulations.  
As mentioned earlier, this could lead to an increased amount of student misuse.  For this reason, this study also measures the 
social trust experienced by faculty members. 
Methodology 
A questionnaire was developed to investigate the faculty awareness of computer usage policies. The questionnaire includes 
demographic items, social trust items, and awareness items.  The demographics section requests the following information:  
the Carnegie classification of the university, whether it is public or private, the academic rank of the respondent, the years of 
academic experience, gender, age, and the total enrollment of the institution.  The social trust section utilizes items drawn 
from existing literature.  The awareness portion of the questionnaire uses a survey instrument previously used to examine 
student awareness of university computer usage policies.  It uses a 7 point Likert scale with 1 being strongly agree and 7 
being strongly disagree.  This instrument was slightly modified to reflect the target population.   
The questionnaire was pilot tested using potential members of the target population.  After evaluation and modification it was 
then administered via the internet to randomly chosen faculty members at a large university.  In all, 300 faculty members 
were surveyed and a total of 75 usable responses were received, for a response rate of 25 percent.  The results were analyzed 
using SPSS. 
Results 
The survey data indicates that the respondents were fairly evenly split among academic departments with a slight majority 
coming from business or technology.  Respondents were also evenly divided by gender, with an average age of 48.  The 
respondents averaged nearly 16 years of academic experience with nearly 11 of that at their current institution.  The 
respondents fell into the following academic categories:  assistant professor (37.8%), associate professor (25.7%), full 
professor (18.9%), and other (16.3%).  Most faculty members (71.6%) reported reading the regulations, and with a relatively 
short average time (8 months) since last reading them. 
The results of the perceptual portion of the questionnaire are shown in Table 1.  These results are divided into 5 separate 
areas:  Awareness, Diffusion, Effectiveness, Perception of the Security Environment, and Social Trust. 
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Awareness 
In terms of awareness, respondents tended to be neutral on their own awareness of the location of the usage rules.  They were, 
however, less confident that their colleagues knew of the usage rules and even less confident in their students knowledge.  
Not surprisingly, those who had read the policy were significantly (.006) more aware of its location.  Female respondents 
were significantly (.026) more likely to agree that faculty members were actively made aware of the policies than male. 
Diffusion 
Respondents were less certain that their colleagues or students had knowledge of the computer usage regulations.  
Respondents who believed that the threat of misuse was more risky were significantly more likely to discuss the usage 
policies with their students in both the classroom (.048) and the lab (.003).  In addition, those who reported high levels of 
knowledge about the risk of computer misuse were significantly more likely to discuss the policies in the classroom (.000) or 
lab (.000). 
Effectiveness 
Respondents generally agreed with these items, indicating a lack of effectiveness of the usage regulations.  Male respondents 
were more likely to agree that faculty members agreed to the regulations without reading them. 
Perception of the Security Environment 
Respondents tended to agree with all items in this category.  In general, respondents felt that the security philosophy was well 
meaning, well known, and was formed in a response to known or suspected security incidents. 
Table 1. Survey results. 
Question  (1=strongly agree, 2 = strongly disagree) Mean 
Awareness  
I am familiar with the Academic Computer Use Regulations 3.37 
I know where the regulations are located. 4.7 
Other faculty members know where the regulations are located. 5.0 
Students know where the regulations are located. 5.59 
Diffusion  
The University insists that faculty members read and reread regulations. 4.65 
The University insists that students read and reread regulations 5.10 
I discuss regulations with students in the classroom 5.32 
I discuss regulations with students in the lab. 5.18 
Effectiveness  
Most faculty agree to the regulations without reading them. 2.39 
Most students agree to the regulations without reading them. 2.75 
Most faculty read the regulations once and then forget about it. 3.23 
Perception of the Security Environment  
Security philosophy is to provide tight security without hindering productivity. 3.19 
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Security efforts are well known. 3.79 
Security efforts are in reaction to known or suspected incidents. 3.69 
Security efforts convince people not to commit misuse. 3.79 
 
Social Trust 
As mentioned earlier, social trust refers to the tendency of laypeople to trust experts to make correct decisions regarding 
technology.  In general, the results support this concept.  First, a significant correlation. (000) exists between the level of 
confidence respondents have in those in charge of computer security and the perceived worth of the policy.  Confidence in 
those in charge of computer security was also positively correlated with confidence in deterrence (.005).  Also, respondents 
with higher levels of confidence in the authorities were significantly (.007) more likely to believe that students agreed to 
computer policies without reading them.  Finally, those with higher degrees of knowledge were significantly (.000) more 
likely to believe that threats to security were risky. 
Conclusion 
This study examined faculty awareness of computer usage regulations in the following areas:  awareness, diffusion, 
effectiveness, and perception of the security environment.  In addition, the concept of social trust as it relates to computer 
security was explored. 
In general, the survey found respondents to be rather neutral in regards to their knowledge of computer security regulations.  
They also tended to have less confidence in their peers’ or students’ knowledge of these regulations.  Not surprisingly, those 
who perceived the risk of computer misuse to be high were more likely to discuss it with their students. 
The most interesting part of this study lies in the concept of social trust as it relates to computer security.  Our results provide 
some support for the notion that many faculty members may simply fail to read the policies since other, potentially more 
knowledgeable, individuals are in charge of preventing computer misuse. 
The results of this study should be viewed in light of a number of limitations.  First, this was a pilot study using an untested 
instrument.  Second, the sample was obtained from a single university.  Finally, the sample could contain some sampling bias 
since those interested in computer security may have been more likely to reply.  More research is needed to further explore 
this phenomenon.  Specifically, the role of social trust in the computer security environment within a university setting needs 
to be further examined. 
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